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Baltzell: The Battle of Olustee (Ocean Pond) Florida

THE BATTLE OF OLUSTEE (OCEAN POND),
FLORIDA
INTRODUCTORY
This account of the battle of Olustee has been prepared at the invitation of the Florida Historical Society from the reports contained in War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies. A careful study of this source leaves one unsatisfied where the aim has been to arrive at definite
facts of such nature as would enable a fairly complete
record to be offered. It is undoubtedly true that these
official records must give more accurate and complete
information than any others, since the reports were
generally made within a few days after the events occurred and have the sanction of official responsibility
for accuracy and completeness. Yet that which is
sought does not exist. Purported facts relating to the
same occurrence are greatly at variance, while important elements necessary for analyzing and deducing other facts are entirely missing.
In attempting to locate troops and to present a
picture in concrete form, acceptance has been given
to a map prepared by Lieut. W. B. Grant, Corps of
Engineers, Confederate Army, and Engineer Officer
of the Confederate force at Olustee. He was present
at the time of the battle, made observations of events
and had conferences with higher commanders of Confederate organizations. From this evidence and a survey of the area, he prepared a sketch to accompany his
official report. Study of reports an both sides leads
to the belief that no better map representation can be
made. Details concerning Union troops are necessarily incomplete, yet Lieut. Grant’s representation
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with respect to those troops is as complete and definite
as a study of the reports of Federal commanders would
reveal. Of course he did not have access to those reports. Reference is frequently made to this sketch in
this article and much space is thus saved in explanation of troop movements and positions.
In offering an account of the engagement, controversial subjects arise with respect to delinquencies of
individuals and some other matters. Discussion of
these questions has not been attempted but has been
purposely avoided. Many comments might be made
which would reflect adversely on various individuals
and organizations; but since it is impossible to gain
an insight into the truth of the many factors and conditions, it would seem to be inappropriate and gratuitous to express definite opinions. Effort is made to
eliminate collateral features and to confine matters
to events bearing directly on the battle itself. A
treatise on the subject has not been the aim.
As is usual in most military engagements, each
commander credits the opposing force with much
greater strength than it possessed. It is believed that
the designated organizations shown and the total
strength given for each force are reasonably correct.
It appears that opposing numbers were about the same
-except that the Federals had an advantage in artillery of four guns-sixteen to twelve.
It is most difficult to deduce the approximate hour
at which events happened. Some Confederate reports
contain statements which assist in this, but Federal
reports are very defective, except in respect to one or
two items. By comparison and by the application of
the factors of space and time, attempt has been made
to arrive at reasonable estimates as to time and place.
The following constitute the material considered :
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War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union
and Confederate Armies:
Series I, Vol. XXXV, Part I. Reports, pp. 274
356 ; Miscellaneous, pp. 463-465, 473-474, 479,
482, 488, 495, 542, 557, 559-560, 578, 580, 582588, 594, 599-601, 603-5, 613-614, 619-22, 632633.
Series I, Vol. XXXV, Part II. pp. 3, 333-339.
Series I, Vol. LIII, pp 24-26, 308.
It is believed no other volumes of these records contain any data pertinent to the operations culminating
in this battle.
Through the courtesy of the Florida Historical Society, I have had access to a valuable paper prepared
by Miss Susan Burdett, of Jacksonville, entitled The
Military Career of Brigadier General Joseph Finegan
of Florida. The author’s research has been extensive
and her presentation relative to the battle covers admirably the main features of that engagement.
BATTLE

OF

OLUSTEE, FEBRUARY 20, 1864

Origin of the Operation-On January 13, 1864,
President Lincoln addressed a letter to Major General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding the Department of
the South, with headquarters at Hilton Head, S. C.,
directing that steps be taken “to reconstruct a loyal
State government in Florida.” Effort along these lines
was stated as being already under way by “some
worthy gentlemen.”
Florida appeared to offer the best chance for such
a possibility due to its relative military helplessness
and easy approach. Also success in this venture would
afford tangible evidence of progress in reestablishing a
state government within the Federal union under the
“late proclamation on the subject,” dated December
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8, 1863. This move, no doubt, had more of the political
than military motive, as the nomination of a president
would take place during the coming months. President Lincoln accordingly sent his private secretary,
John Hay, commissioned as major for the purpose
(later Secretary of State under President Roosevelt)
to confer with General Gillmore and to deliver some
blank forms, the use of which he would explain, “to
aid in the reconstruction.” The reconstruction was to
be accomplished “in the most speedy way possible.”
It was an unusual procedure for the President thus to
issue orders directly to a military commander for a
military expedition and without the War Department
having official knowledge of the undertaking.
Federal Preliminary Measures - In executing the
directions of President Lincoln, General Gillmore
promptly communicated both with the Secretary of
War (Mr. Stanton) and the General-in-Chief of the
Army (General Halleck) stating his purpose to “occupy the west bank of the St. John’s River, in Florida,
very soon-preparatory to an advance west at an early
date,” and asking for troops to replace those he intended to withdraw from stations in his department
for use in Florida. So far as can be determined no
additional troops were furnished. Later General Halleck was informed by General Gillmore of the purposes
of the expedition, which are summarized as follows:
to procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, and other
products ; to cut off one source of Confederate food
supplies ; to secure recruits for his colored regiments ;
to “inaugurate measures for the speedy restoration
of Florida to her allegiance.” The last purpose was
explained to be in accordance with President Lincoln’s
personal instructions.
In keeping with his plans, General Gillmore directed Brigadier General Truman Seymour to proceed
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with a specified body of troops from Hilton Head by

water to Jacksonville, and to depart on the night of
February 5-6, so as to arrive at Jacksonville on the
7th. This was carried out and the landing was made
on that date. The troops of the expedition are not
here enumerated, as all troops reported as participating in the Battle of Olustee are shown later. The
number landed at Jacksonville are given as about 7000.
Confederate Preliminary Measures - At the time
of the arrival of the Federal expedition at Jacksonville,
Brigadier General Joseph Finegan, commanding the
District of East Florida (all of Florida east of the
Suwannee River) with headquarters at Lake City,
had the following numbers of organizations under his
command, all being Florida troops: Two battalions
and three independent companies of infantry, seven
companies of cavalry, two batteries of artillery comprising a strength at the end of January, 1864, as
present for duty, 89 officers and 1178 men. This force
was well scattered over the territory, because the Federal troops occupied Jacksonville and various localities within 50 to 75 miles of Jacksonville. The strength
of the Confederates in the immediate vicinity of Lake
City, and considered ready for use at time of the landing of the Federals at Jacksonville, cannot be ascertained. On February 7th, General Finegan promptly
notified General Beauregard of the Federal expedition.
General Beauregard commanding the Districts of
South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, with headquarters at Charleston, took immediate steps to strengthen
General Finegan’s forces. Orders were sent on February 8th to the Commanding General, District of
Middle Florida (Brigadier General W. M. Gardner)
at Quincy and the Commanding General at Savannah,
directing prompt action in furnishing maximum reenforcements. Three days later General Finegan re-
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ported 490 infantry, 110 cavalry and two pieces of
artillary available at Lake City. The bulk of these
troops came from middle Florida in compliance with
General Beauregard’s orders. Between February 10th
and 19th (the exact date not obtainable), reenforcements were such as to make General Finegan’s force
available for employment, reported by him, as approximately 5200 infantry and cavalry, and three batteries
of artillery-12 guns, with strength about 250. This
force was then concentrated at or near Olustee, twelve
or, thirteen miles east of Lake City. The troops thus
assembled consisted of the following numbers of organizations or major portions thereof :
Infantry : Florida, 2 (3) battalions ; Georgia, 8
regiments, 1 battalion. (It is not certain whether the 2d Florida Battalion
was present or employed in the battle).
Cavalry : Florida, 1 regiment, 1 battalion ; Georgia, 1 regiment.
Artillery: Florida, 1 battery; Georgia, 2 batteries.
Events Following Landing of Federal Troops at
Jacksonville (Prior to battle) Federal - On February
8th, (one day after landing), 3 columns-2 Infantry
and 1 mounted-strength not determinable, were dispatched toward Baldwin, 18 to 20 miles west of Jacksonville, with the mission of penetrating into the interior, seizing supplies and equipment and destroying
those of value to the Confederates, and reconnoitering
the situation and gradually moving a field force westward to hold certain territory and overcome any Confederate force that might resist. At this time there
seemed to be no intention of employing the landing
force to attempt penetration as far as the Suwannee
River (about 100 miles west of Jacksonville, and 40
miles west of Lake City) with the determination of
destroying the railroad there and severing the two dis-
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tricts of Florida. In fact, the immediate intention of
General Gillmore did not contemplate advancing beyond the Little St. Mary’s (designated generally in
Federal reports as the south prong of the St. Mary’s
River or South St. Mary’s) 30 to 35 miles from Jacksonville.
The mounted column above mentioned, commanded
by Colonel Guy V. Henry, advancing more rapidly than
the foot troops, encountered on the 8th, about twilight
and later, a scattered Confederate force of about 350
men of all arms under Lieut. Colonel A. H. McCormick
at Camp Finegan (7 miles from Jacksonville) and at
Ten Mile Run, where the Confederate loss was four
pieces of artillery, captured about midnight, and probably 25 men, 50 animals and a small amount of transportation. The Federal loss is not shown. Colonel
Henry reached Baldwin early on the 9th and there captured three railroad cars (one containing a 3 inch
rifled gun and caisson and other supplies to the value
of about one-half million dollars. Baldwin was the
crossing of two railroads: The Fernandina and Cedar
Keys and the Central of Florida (probably now the
Seaboard Air Line) which were very important lines
to the Confederates. With the capture of Baldwin,
Generals Gillmore and Seymour proceeded there, arriving late on the 9th.
On the morning of the 10th, Colonel Henry advanced to the Little St. Mary’s at Barber’s (a plantation). Here he was opposed by Major Robert Harrison with two or three companies of cavalry, which
were enroute from Camp Cooper (near Fernandina)
to join General Finegan. After some fighting the- Confederates withdrew, apparently on discovering the
superior strength of the Federals, and continued toward Lake City. Federal casualties appear to have
been about twenty killed and wounded ; the Confeder-
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ate losses about five. The Federals promptly advanced
on Sanderson, seven or eight miles to the west, and remained there until the next day, the 11th. Contact
with Harrison’s Cavalry seems to have been lost, and
nothing was captured by Henry at Sanderson.
On the morning of the llth, Colonel Henry set out
towards Lake City, and around 10 a.m. was opposed
about three miles east of that place by General Finegan, whose position was hastily intrenched. Finegan’s
strength is reported by him as 490 Infantry, 110 Cavalry and 2 guns--consisting largely of reinforcements
from Middle Florida. Heavy skirmishing with the
Federals resulted and after several hours Colonel Henry withdrew to Sanderson. The Federal strength
by number is nowhere officially stated, but consisted
of one regiment of mounted infantry and a battalion
of cavalry with four pieces of artillery-which latter
were not used in the engagement. Civilians living
along the highway estimated the Federal strength as
1400, but it was probably less.
On the 14th, a detachment, reported as fifty Federal
cavalrymen of Colonel Henry’s command from Sanderson, entered Gainesville (about fifty miles distant) and
captured large stores of supplies. Gainesville is reported to have been held for fifty-six hours, during
which period the Federals were attacked by Captain
Dickison, whose strength is claimed to have been two
companies of cavalry. The Federal detachment returned to Sanderson on the 17th.
On the 15th, General Gillmore left Jacksonville for
his headquarters at Hilton Head. Various conferences
had been had with General Seymour, which indicate
definite instructions to General Seymour and which
made clear that his advance in force would not be beyond the Little St. Mary’s and that that point and
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Baldwin were to be strengthened so as to be held without question.
Between the 17th and 20th no distinctive operations
are reported by the Federals. To include the 19th,
Federal troops, to be employed the next day near
Olustee, were concentrated at Sanderson and the vicinity of the Little St. Mary’s.
Confederate. - During the period from February
8th to 19th, the Confederates were concerned mainly
with the concentration of troops at and near Lake City.
Previous contacts with Federals between there and
Jacksonville have been noted, and the last in that general area was on the 11th near Lake City. From then
until the 19th inclusive, there is shown a rising
strength in Confederate forces. Reports of General
Finegan set forth the following troops as being at or
near Lake City: February llth, 600 infantry and cavalry and 2 guns; 13th, 2250 infantry and cavalry and
10 guns ; 19th, 5200 infantry and cavalry and 3 batteries (12 guns). Between the 11th and 19th the increase was due to Georgia reinforcements. This force
was placed in camp at Olustee and had made some
progress in entrenching its position, altho the “proposed line of work” (shown on map) was not completed by the 19th. Points marked “C” and “D” were
separate intrenchments and ready by the 17th. No
doubt a limited amount of preparation along the “proposed line of work” had been made by the 20th.
Opposing Forces, Their Information, Plans and OrFederals. As previously stated, the Federal
ders.
force was commanded by Brigadier General Truman
Seymour, and consisted of the following, the strength
stated by him to be “near 5500 officers and men and
16 guns:”
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Colonel Guy V. Henry’s Mounted Brigade:
2 Squadrons, Independent Battalion, Mass. Cavalry, Major
A. H. Stevens
40th Regiment, Mass. Volunteers (Infantry), (Commander
not shown)
Horse Battery B, 1st U. S. Artillery (4 Guns), Capt. S. S.
Elder
Colonel J. R. Hawley’s Brigade (Infantry):
7th Connecticut, Capt. Skinner (10-365)
7th New Hampshire, Col. J. C. Abbott (30-675)
8th U. S. Colored Troops, Col. C. W. Fribley (21-544)
Colonel W. B. Barton‘s Brigade (Infantry) :
47th New York, Col. H. Moore
48th New York, Major W. B. Coan
115th New York, Col. S. Sammon
Colonel James Montgomery’s Brigade (Infantry) :
54th Massachusetts (Colored) Col. E. N. Hollowell (13-480)
1st North Carolina (Colored) Lt. Col. W. N. Reed
Battery E. 3d U. S. Artillery (6 guns) Capt. John Hamilton
Battery M, 1st U. S. Artillery with
1 section James’ Rhode Island Battery (6 guns) Capt. L.
L. Langdon

No data is at hand for deducing the battle strength
of each organization above, except in four cases shown
in parentheses. In these cases the first figure is the
number of officers, the second the number of men. The
three batteries may be taken as 75 men each, their approximate battle strength.
On February 20th, the Federal commander’s information regarding the Confederate strength, location
and dispositions was apparently quite indefinite. In
his final report on the engagement (March 25, 1864)
General Seymour stated that he had no “doubt as to
the propriety of a conflict on equal terms.” On February 22d, in a partial report, he states that “according to the best information” the Confederates were
4000 to 5000 strong. After the battle (in the same
report) he states that “the enemy was greatly superior
in force.”
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The plans of General Seymour, merely for the
general employment of his force, were formed at Baldwin on the 17th. On that date he wrote to General
Gillmore, then at Hilton Head and who had left General Seymour’s headquarters on the 15th (see above),
that he had decided to move to the Suwannee River for
the purpose of destroying the railroad there. On the
22d (after the battle) he stated to the same authority
that he moved from Barber’s (on the Little St. Mary’s)
on the 20th “with the intention of meeting the enemy
at or near Lake City and of pushing the mounted force
to the Suwannee River, to destroy if possible the railroad bridge at that stream.” This plan of action was,
as stated, entirely contrary to instructions of General
Gillmore, who, in a sharp letter to General Seymour
on the 18th, in reply to the latter’s letter of the 17th,
said, among other things: “You must have forgotten
my last instructions, which were for the present to hold
Baldwin and the Saint Mary’s South Fork as your
outposts to the westward of Jacksonville-. ” Whatever may have been the lure and reasons, General
Seymour clearly disregarded the orders of his chief.
No orders are found for the advance, but the march
toward Lake City, on the 20th, was commenced in the
following order, starting about 7 A.M. from Barber’s
(Little St. Mary’s) and joined by Henry’s mounted
force at Sanderson :
Henry’s mounted force with Elder’s Battery, (from
Sanderson).
Hawley’s brigade, with Hamilton’s Battery.
Barton’s brigade, with Langdon’s battery.
The trains and medical vehicles.
Montgomery’s brigade.
It would appear that Hawley’s brigade, at least,
marched in three parallel columns (by regiment), and
that Henry’s troops did not continue to lead the ad-
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vance at the time first touch was had with the Confederates.
Specific performance of Henry’s mounted force
during the march and the succeeding battle is not contained in any of the reports.
Confederate. As previously stated, the Confederate
force was commanded by Brigadier General Joseph
Finegan, and consisted of the following, he reporting
his “whole effective force as infantry 4600; cavalry
less than 600 ; artillery, 3 batteries-twelve guns” :
First Brigade (infantry), Brigadier General A. H. Colquitt:
6th Georgia, Colonel John T. Lofton
19th Georgia, Colonel James H. Neal
23d Georgia, Lt. Colonel James H. Huggins
27th Georgia, Colonel Charles T. Zachry
28th Georgia, Colonel Tully Graybill
6th Florida Battalion, Lt. Colonel John M. Martin
Chatham (Georgia) Artillery (4 guns), attached, Capt.
John F. Wheaton.
Second Brigade (infantry), Colonel George P. Harrison, 32d
Georgia:
32d Georgia Volunteers, Major W. T. Holland
1st Georgia Regulars, Captain H. A. Cannon
64th Georgia Regulars, Colonel John W. Evans
1st Florida Battalion, Lieut. Colonel Charles F. Hopkins
Bonaud’s Battalion (Ga.), Major A. Bonaud
Guerard’s (Ga.) Battery (4 guns), attached, Captain John
M. Guerard.
Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Caraway Smith, 2d Florida Cavalry:
4th Georgia Cavalry, Colonel Duncan L. Clinch (250)
2d Florida Cavalry, Lt. Col. A. H. McCormick (202)
5th Florida Cavalry Battalion, Major G. W. Scott (140 approx.)
Reserve: Florida Light Artillery (4 guns), Captain R. H.
Gamble.
Colonel R. B. Thomas was assigned as Chief of Artillery.

No data is at hand for deducing the battle strength
of each organization above, except in three cases shown
in parentheses. These numbers probably cover the
strength for both officers and men. The batteries
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may be taken as 70 men each, their approximate battle
strength.
General Finegan’s information about the Federal
strength that could probably be employed in any serious advance, pointed to a force of three regiments of
infantry, some cavalry and artillery. He, like his
opponent, seemed not to have maintained reconnaissance with the other’s main force ; and consequently
had no specific knowledge on which to base definite
plans. Higher Confederate authority had no general
plan of action other than to reenforce General Finegan to the maximum that could be taken from other
sources, with the purposes of enabling him to offer
successful resistance to a serious westward advance
by the Federals. With this idea of resistance General
Finegan intended to entrench a position at Olustee, as
shown on map. Here both flanks would be covered:
to the north by Ocean Pond, to the south by a swamp,
while the front presented very difficult, if not impassable, ground. He hoped to be able to entice the Federals into attacking this position ; and on belief that
they had advanced to within about three miles of the
position around noon, he sent his cavalry, supported
by the 64th Georgia and two companies of the 32d
Georgia, with orders to “advance and skirmish with
the enemy and draw them to our works.” The remainder of the force was “prepared for action,” but
in what manner is not stated. These measures constitute the initial plans for meeting the Federals.
Verbal orders no doubt covered all the above plans ;
and nothing is found of record to change that assumption.
The Terrain. - The attached sketch fully shows the
details of the area on which the battle was fought.
Those familiar with this type of Florida topography
recognize it as perfectly flat with pine growth and a
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covering of thin grass, weeds and straw. No definite
clearings existed except the small fields near and
within the battle area. The ground, except the pond
and marsh areas, was readily passable. The pine trees
afforded cover for individual riflemen, but no irregular
ground approaches nor that type of cover for groups
or masses existed.
Concealed maneuver of forces could be made at
reasonable distances from either opponent due to the
screening afforded by the pine growth, and should the
Confederates remain at their position, that position
could be turned from the south. Should that be attempted, it would also offer flanking opportunities to
the Confederates against the turning force. The area
on which the fight did occur should have presented
chances to the Federals for forcing the Confederates,
through proper flanking, against the larger bay and
with promise of serious results to them. Likewise,
had it been practicable for the Confederates to have
forced the issue farther to the rear of the actual battle area, and have rested their left flank on the large
bay and while the bulk of their force was massed to
their right, correspondingly serious results to the Federals might have resulted. This successful Confederate action could have forced the Federals against
either or both bays, with no outlet except the narrow ground between the two bays and the large perfect obstacle of Ocean Pond directly to the rear.
It would appear most improbable that the Federals
would or could attack the Confederate position partially prepared as shown at Olustee, because it could
be reached only by narrow columns on the railroad
and road from the east and over the road shown from
the southeast. Such a plan of final attack could offer
no chance of success. Likewise, would the Confederates be handicapped should they attempt to move

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol9/iss4/4

14

Baltzell: The Battle of Olustee (Ocean Pond) Florida

213
forward from that position to attack the Federals
formed up to the east and south and within attacking
range. Each force, under these circumstances, would
be limited to an artillery duel that could gain no decisive ends.
In the failure of either force to maneuver for the
purpose of decisive flanking action, a straight meeting engagement, with movements directly forward,
would result in an encounter in the open without advantage of ground to either. And that is what happened.
THE BATTLE
The order of march of the Federals toward Lake
City and the initial steps taken by the Confederate
commander to gain touch with them are mentioned
above.
Somewhere between Sanderson and before the Federals had reached the area at the eastern boundary
of the sketch (Hawley’s brigade marching in the lead
with its three regiments in line of regimental columns), the 7th Connecticut was ordered to go forward
as a protecting force about one-half mile ahead of the
column with skirmishers properly provided. This regiment consisted of four companies formed provisionally from the original ten companies comprising the
regiment, and employed two companies as skirmishers.
The 7th New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored continued to follow abreast of each other, the former being on the right, with the line of march on the road
for that regiment and the 8th Colored advancing via
the railroad. The position and location of Henry’s
mounted troops are not known.
The skirmishers (leading companies, 7th Connecticut) encountered the Confederate cavalry (probably
small groups of scouts) about four miles east of Olus-
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tee, which would be near the road junction shown
towards the eastern edge of the attached map. This
first contact occurred probably about 12:30 P. M.
As nearly as can be judged, the Confederate commander sent forward his cavalry about. 11 A. M.;
followed, about noon, by the 64th Georgia and two
companies of the 32d Georgia, as a support to the
cavalry, with orders to “skirmish with the enemy and
draw them to our works.” The remaining Confederate
forces were held at camp and “placed under arms and
prepared for action.”
When the two forces first gained contact, the skirmish line of the 7th Connecticut apparently was not
checked, but steadily advanced while the Confederate
cavalry fell back. The Federal skirmish line arrived
in the vicinity of the crossing of the highway and railroad at about 2 P. M. (two and one-quarter miles east
of Olustee). Here they were met by Confederate infantry. The presence of this infantry came about as
follows :
About 12:30 P. M., General Finegan directed General Colquitt to move forward with three regiments of
his brigade and Gamble’s Battery (shown in above
table as, “Reserve”‘) and to take command of all Confederate troops at the front. He was further directed
to drive back the Federal force if not too strong, and
to ask for needed assistance. The three regiments Colquitt took were the 6th, 19th and 28th Georgia regiments ; General Finegan believing at that time that the
Federal force consisted of three infantry regiments,
with some cavalry and artillery. The 64th Georgia,
two companies off 32d Georgia and Smith’s cavalry
had already preceded the force Colquitt had, and, under
the orders, became a part of his command. The battle, proper, was here initiated with no definite plan
except to attack whatever was met. All employment
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of troops throughout the fight was apparently left
to General Colquitt. With this decision, the thought
of drawing the Federals to the Confederate position
was given up. The reasons for such a change of plan
is not indicated. However it would seem very doubtful whether the Federals could be so enticed, and seemingly General Finegan believed his force at least equal
to the Federals and was not fearful of risking a fight
in the open.
Details are not available, but no doubt the Connecticut skirmishers were first attacked by elements
of the 64th and 32d Georgia regiments around 2 P. M.
about where the railroad and highway cross. This attack resolved itself into what is shown on the map
as the “2 position” for the Confederates and the “1st
position” for the Federals.
The 7th New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored
regiments had probably been following the 7th Connecticut at about one-half mile as ordered, and as the
latter fell back from the “1st position” the other two
Federal regiments were ordered to deploy and attempted to do so on what is indicated on map as the
“2 position” for the Federals. In the meantime the
7th Connecticut continued its withdrawal and passed
to the rear of the other two regiments. This withdrawal probably began between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M.
The Federal commander’s (Seymour’s) plan, as
stated by him, was to place all three Federal batteries
approximately on one line (and near the locality shown
as “captured guns”), to have these batteries supported
and protected by his attacking infantry in that vicinity, and with the other necessary portion of his infantry to attack the Confederate left after the Confederate line had been subjected to heavy punishment by
the fire of Federal artillery.
In attempting to execute this plan of action the 7th
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New Hampshire and 8th U. S. Colored regiments
undertook to get into position on either side and somewhat forward of the artillery which was trying to get
to the assigned. locations chosen for the batteries.
These positions are mentioned above. The 7th New
Hampshire, an experienced regiment, in making this
deployment became involved in confusion through trying to conform to a change of orders after the deployment had been started. This circumstance, aided by
the fire of the Confederates, brought about real disorder and eventuated in final uncontrolled retirement
of the regiment. The 8th U. S. Colored, not experienced and without much training, after partially getting into its position, was strongly affected by the
action of the 7th New Hampshire on its right; and,
under the effect of Confederate fire, also ultimately
gave way badly. The action of these two regiments
greatly hampered the employment of the Federal artillery. The artillery fire was masked to a great degree,
for the infantry became mixed with the personnel of
the batteries.
In this state of confusion the batteries also lost
both men and animals from Confederate fire, and were
forced to abandon their positions. Being unable to
withdraw all their guns, six of the sixteen pieces were
captured as the Confederates reached the former battery positions. These events were critical incidents
in the battle, and probably occurred during a period
from 3:30 to 5:00 P. M.
The movements of the Confederates which brought
about these conditions were, in general, as follows:
Upon becoming engaged with the 7th Connecticut
and believing the Federals were bringing a strong
force to the scene of action, General Colquitt directed
the cavalry to take position well out on the flanks and
to protect them -one regiment on each flank. Clinch’s
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I

regiment went to the left and McCormick’s to the
right ; each general location is shown on the map. At
the same time he sent orders to other troops of his
brigade to join him. These orders brought forward
the 23d Georgia, 6th Florida and Wheaton’s Battery.
These troops had already been started forward by
General Finegan. They soon reached their destination
and were placed as shown in “3d position”; Wheaton’s
battery (Chatham Artillery) replacing Gamble’s battery which, through loss of animals and injury to limbers had been reduced in efficiency. About 1:30 P. M.
General Finegan ordered other troops to Colquitt’s,
assistance, and under the order Colonel Harrison
moved forward from camp. He took with him the 32d
Georgia (less two Companies already with Colquitt),
1st Georgia Regulars, and one section of Guerard’s
Battery. The troops left at camp were the 1st Florida
Battalion, Bonaud’s Battalion, 27th Georgia and one
section of Guerard’s Battery. Shortly after 3:00
P. M. Harrison’s troops had reached the battle position and were generally located as shown in “3d Position.” Harrison, by Colquitt’s orders, was placed in
command of the left portion of the line, which presumably consisted of the 1st Georgia Regulars, 32d Georgia and 6th Georgia. Colquitt commanded the remaining organizations on the right. The section of Guerard’s battery which accompanied Harrison was originally placed on the right of Colquitt’s command. The
combined effort of the Confederates produced a slow
advance which at about 4:30 P. M. caused the 7th
New Hampshire and, 8th U. S. Colored to withdraw
finally from their position.
Before the two Federal regiments just mentioned
had made their final and confused retirement, Barton’s
brigade had appeared in line towards the Confederate
left front, and originally took position farther forward
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than is shown on the map. However the pressure from
that part of the Confederate line slowly pushed them
back to the vicinity indicated on the map.
With the increase of Confederate effort and the
pressure on Barton’s brigade, Montgomery’s brigade
(54th Mass. and 1st N. C.) arrived on the field; and
with the 7th Connecticut (re-organized after its earlier experience) placed between these two, the fighting continued. The Federal lines, however, were being
slowly forced back.
During the period from about 4:30 to 5:00 P. M.
the 6th Florida Battalion, on the Confederate right,
changed its front of attack, and assisted in causing
the gradual withdrawal of the 54th Massachusetts
and 7th Connecticut. At about 5:30 P. M. the Confederates had reached the vicinity of what is shown as
“4th Position.” Also about this hour, the ammunition
of the 6th and 32d Georgia regiments (left of the line)
had become practically exhausted ; and for probably
twenty minutes, in this condition, their position was
held, and until replenishment of ammunition could be
accomplished shortly before 6:00 P. M.
The Confederates were gradually bringing their
full strength into action and around 5:30 to 6:00 P. M.
the last troops held back near Olustee had reached the
field. These were the 1st Florida Battalion, Bonaud’s
Battalion, 27th Georgia and the second (remaining)
section of Guerard’s Battery. This infantry was placed
forward of the center of the line to hold the Federals
(see map) while troops on the original line were being supplied with ammunition ; the section of Guerard’s Battery went into position to the left and rear
of Wheaton’s Battery (see location between “3d and
4th Positions”).
With the arrival of the above troops and after ammunition had been supplied, General Colquitt ordered
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a general advance, instructing Colonel Harrison to
place the 6th and 32d Georgia so as to flank the Federal right. These results were brought about shortly
after 6:00 P. M. and caused the general retreat of the
Federals.
The Confederates followed for about a mile. The
Cavalry had been ordered to take up the pursuit, but
acted very timidly and apparently did not proceed
farther than the road junction shown on the eastern
side of the map. The cavalry had been joined about
4:00 P. M. by Scott’s Battalion of Cavalry, which took
position near McCormick’s cavalry, on the Confederate right flank. On account of approaching darkness,
the reported exhaustion of the infantry and lack of
supplies, General Finegan did not attempt to press
his opportunity but yielded to the recommendations
of his subordinates that no serious pursuit be undertaken. Neither the Federal nor Confederate cavalry
appears to have accomplished anything of value preceding, during or after the fight. Aside from indications that each was placed on the flanks of their own
infantry during the action, the Confederate cavalry
gained nothing from its opportunity and orders to
pursue, while the Federal cavalry’s positive activity
of any nature is not ascertainable. The greater portion of the Federals proceeded unmolested that night
to Barber’s (about 13 miles), and the 7th Connecticut, as rear guard, is shown as having reached there
about midnight. Some sources state that the Federal
cavalry also performed rear guard duties.
On the 21st the retreat of the Federals brought
them to Baldwin ; and on the 22d the movement was
continued to the vicinity of Jacksonville. The Confederates arrived at Sanderson on the 22d and on the
26th General Finegan had his troops near McGirts
Creek, 12 to 13 miles from Jacksonville.
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Losses.-The officially reported casualties recorded
for each force are as follows :
FEDERAL

(The figures on left of
Organization
115th N. Y. Vols .........
47th N. Y. Vols .........
48th N. Y. Vols .........
7th Conn. Vols .........
7th N. H. Vols .........
8th U. S. (Colored)....
1st N. C. (Colored)....
54th Mass. (Colored) __
40th Mass. Mtd. Inf .........
Ind. Bn. Mass. Cav .........
Btry. B. 1st U. S. Art.
(Horse) ..................
Btry. E. 3d U. S. Art.....
Btry. M. 1st U. S. Art...
Part. Btry. C. 3d R. I.
Art

dash are officers; on the right, men)
Killed Wounded Missing Aggregate
2- 27 4- 204 1- 58
7- 289
3- 27 4- 193 0- 86
7- 306
l- 16 l- 153 0- 44
2- 213
l- 4 0- 42 0- 22
l- 68
l- 16 7- 64 0-120
8- 200
1- 48 8- 180 l- 72 10- 300
2- 20 8- 123 0- 77 10- 220
0- 13 3- 62 0- 8
3- 83
0- 2 l- 28 0- 5
1- 35
.......
0 - 5 ..............
0 5
0- 33 1- 12 ..................
0- 11 4- 18 0- 6
0- 4 1- 21 0- 6

1- 16
4- 35
1- 31

1
0 5
.
06
.................. 1 1 - 1 9 2 4 2 - 1 1 1 0 2 - 5 0 4 55-1806

.................. O -

Total

Some of the officers killed and wounded are given as follows :
Killed (5)
Wounded (11)
Col. Fribley . . . . . . . . .Major Burritt
Lt. Dempsey
1st. N. C. (Colored)...Lt. Col Reed
115th N. Y. .................. Capt. Vanderveer.........Col. Sammon
7th N. H. ..........................., 1st Lt. G. W.Taylor .........2d Lt. H. J. Davis
47th N. Y. ......................................................Col.Moore
48th N. Y. ............................................................... ..Capt. N. A. Elfing
3d Art. ................................................................ Capt. Hamilton
Lt. Myrick
1st Art. ............................................................Lt. McCrea
Capt. R. H. Jewett
Organization not given
1st Lt. H. W. Littlefield
1st Lt. E. G. Tomlinson
Organization
8th U. S. (Colored
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CONFEDERATE

(The figures on the left of dash are officers; on the right, men)
Organization
Killed
Colquitt’s Brigade:
6th Florida Battalion l - 8
Chatham Art. ......... .......
6th Georgia ......... l - 4
19th Georgia ......... l - 7
23d Georgia ......... 0 - 2
27th Georgia ......... 0 - 7
28th Georgia ......... 0 - 1 0
Gambles Btry. ......... 0 - 2

Wounded Missing Aggregate

Total ..................

3-40

31-410

0-2

82
3
61
96
70
74
95
5
______
486

Harrison’s Brigade:
1st Fla. Battalion .......
Bonaud’s Battalion .......
1st Georgia ..............
32d Georgia ..............
64th Georgia ..........
Guerard’s Btry. ............

0- 3
l-11
l- 2
0-15
2-15

0- 47
2- 93
l- 24
6-143
9- 79
0 - 2

.......
0-2
.......
.......
0-2
.......

50
109
28
164
107
2

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grand Total .......

4-46
7-86

18-388
49-798

0-4
0-6

460
946

4- 69
0 - 3
2- 54
7- 81
4- 62
8- 59
6- 79
0 - 3

........
.......
.......
.......
0-2
.......
.......
.......

No casualties are shown for cavalry organizations.
Some of the officers killed and wounded are given as follows:
Organization
Killed (10)
Wounded (22)
6th Fla. Bn................ Lt. Thos. J. Hill
6th Georgia.............. Lt. Combs
19th Georgia .............. Johnson (Adjutant)....
28th Georgia..............
Capt. Crawford
1st Fla. Bn ..............
Lt. Col. C. F. Hopkins
Lt. S. K. Collins
Lt. T. Williams
Bonaud’s Bn. (Ga.)..Lt. W. W. Holland.....Lt. J. W. Hall
(Fla. Co. attached) Lt. C. Pierce
1st Georgia .............. Capt. H. A. Cannon .. Capt. A. F. Hill
Lt. Dancy .............. Lt. P. H. Morel
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32d Georgia .............. Major Holland .............. Capt. W. D. Cornwell
Lt. R. J. Butler ....... ..... Lt. W. T. Moody
Lt. W. L. Jenkins
Lt. J. H. Pittman
Lt. Morris Dawson
64th Georgia...... . . . . . . . . Lt. Col. Jas. Barrow..Col. J. W. Evans
Lt. P. A. Waller ....... Maj. W. H. Weems
Capt. R. W. Craven
Lt. J. S. Thrasher
Lt. M. L. Raines
Capt. J. K. Redd
Lt. T. M. Beasley
Capt. R. A. Brown
Lt. J. F. Burch
Col. D. L. Clinch
4th Georgia Cavalry..

Medical Provisions.- The Federals had twelve ambulances for medical transportation as well as means
for setting up a first aid station. At the beginning of
the fight equipment and transportation were brought
forward rather close to their troops ; but due to the
confusion of retreating troops and the wounded as
well as danger from Confederate artillery fire, the medical station and ambulances were withdrawn to the
eastern side of the small stream and marsh shown on
that section of map. Meager information indicates
that this location was used for probably three hours ;
the wounded arriving there by walking, by litter, on
animals, wagons, caissons, ambulances and whatever
mode of transportation that could be utilized. In the
evacuation of the casualties from this battlefield station, many wounded had to be left, but those able to
walk or for whom transportation of any nature existed were taken to Barber’s during the night. From
there by rail and wagon, cases were forwarded to
Jacksonville.
No information is obtainable concerning the definite handling of Confederate casualties or the medical
service available. The smaller number of casualties
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probably offered less of a problem and the town of
Lake City was not far distant. It was used for hospitalization. The Federal wounded falling into the
hands of the Confederates were, in part, sent to Tallahassee, and no doubt some cases were handled in
Lake City.
GEORGE F. BALTZELL, U.S.A.
Colonel Infantry
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